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INTRODUCTION
End users face serious security risks related to 
processes maliciously misusing users’ authority. 
One of the largest threats to end users is flaws in 
applications such as PDF readers, media players, 
web browsers and email clients (Dhamankar, 
Dausin,  Eisenbarth,  &  King,  2009).  These 
vulnerabilities can inadvertently allow remote 
attackers to subvert the behaviour of programs 
in order to carry out malicious actions. Trojan 
horses,  where  malware  poses  as  legitimate 
software and carries out malicious activities, 
are also a significant threat.
Towards Usable  
Application-Oriented 
Access Controls:
Qualitative Results from a Usability Study 
of SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM
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ABSTRACT
A number of security mechanisms are available for improving the security of systems by restricting the actions 
of individual programs to activities that are authorised. However, configuring these systems to enforce end 
users’ own security goals is often beyond their expertise. Little research has investigated the usability issues 
associated with application-oriented access controls. This paper presents the results of a qualitative analy-
sis of user perceptions of the usability of three application-oriented security systems: SELinux, AppArmor, 
and FBAC-LSM. Qualitative analysis identified a number of factors that affect the usability of application-
restriction mechanisms. These themes are used to compare the usability of the three systems studied, and it 
is proposed that these factors can be used to inform the design of new systems and development of existing 
ones. Changes to the three security systems are also proposed to address or mitigate specific usability issues 
that were identified.
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Linux,  like  most  operating  systems, 
typically allows applications to act with all the 
authority of a user. The Linux discretionary 
access control (DAC) mechanism authorises 
processes to run with the full authority of the 
associated user, regardless of the trustworthi-
ness of programs. In the current threat climate 
this approach is inadequate as a sole access 
control measure; basing security decisions on 
the identity of the user does not protect against 
processes which act maliciously due to software 
vulnerabilities or malware.
The Linux Security Module (LSM) frame-
work provides a means for security extensions 
to be incorporated into the Linux kernel (Wright, 
Cowan, Smalley, Morris, & Kroah-Hartman, 
2002). Many of the LSMs that have been de-
veloped can address threats posed by malicious 
code, by restricting specific processes to autho-
rised actions. Examples of LSMs that can place 
restrictions on the activities of processes include 
SELinux (Smalley, Vance, & Salamon, 2001), 
AppArmor (previously known as SubDomain) 
(Cowan et al., 2000), TOMOYO (Harada, Ho-
rie, & Tanaka, 2004), and SMACK (Schaufler, 
2008). However, as is typical for this class of 
security mechanism (DeWitt & Kuljis, 2006), 
these systems face usability challenges that can 
limit the practical benefit to end users.
A new model, known as the functionality-
based application confinement (FBAC) model, 
has been designed to meet end user usability 
goals (Schreuders & Payne, 2008a). The model 
incorporates  policy  abstractions,  known  as 
functionalities, that can model the privileges 
authorised to processes based on the high level 
features applications provide (Schreuders & 
Payne, 2008b). A Linux implementation of the 
FBAC model has been developed, known as 
FBAC-LSM (FBAC-LSM is free open source 
software  available  at:  http://schreuders.org/
FBAC-LSM). The implementation also lever-
ages automation techniques, which the FBAC 
model is naturally suited to.
A study has been conducted to compare 
the usability of three different approaches to 
application restrictions: FBAC-LSM, and two 
of the most widely deployed Linux security ex-
tensions, SELinux and AppArmor (Schreuders, 
McGill, & Payne, 2011). The results showed 
that the functionality-based mechanism enabled 
end users to effectively control the privileges 
of their applications with far greater success 
than the widely used alternatives. In particular, 
policies created using FBAC-LSM were more 
likely to be enforced and exhibited significantly 
lower risk exposure, while not interfering with 
the ability of the application to perform its in-
tended task (Schreuders et al., 2011). In order 
to further explore and understand the reasons 
for the usability differences between the three 
security systems, this paper presents the re-
sults of qualitative analysis of the participant 
feedback for each of the security systems. The 
qualitative  analysis  identified  a  number  of 
emergent themes in participants’ comments. 
These themes indicate a number of factors that 
affect the usability of application-restriction 
mechanisms, and are likely to be responsible 
for the usability differences between the se-
curity systems studied. These results are then 
discussed and used to compare the usability 
of the three systems studied. The paper also 
proposes changes to all three systems to address 
or mitigate specific usability issues that were 
identified throughout the study.
BACKGROUND
To reduce the threat of the problems posed by 
the limitations of user-oriented access control, 
application confinement has become an active 
area of research (Berman, Bourassa, & Selberg, 
1995; Cowan et al., 2000; Goldberg, Wagner, 
Thomas, & Brewer, 1996; Hallyn & Kearns, 
2000; Harada et al., 2004; Ott, 2002; Provos, 
2002; Smalley et al., 2001). Application-orient-
ed access controls provide restrictions based on 
the identity of the application or process rather 
than just the identity of the user. Application 
confinement can limit the ability of applica-
tions to access resources outside of those they 
require to perform legitimately, thus restricting 
the damage malware or exploited vulnerabilities 
can cause, and can limit software to actions that International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 6(1), 57-76, January-March 2012   59
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are those expected by whoever configures the 
security policy: end users, administrators, or 
software developers.
Despite the fact that usability has long 
been  acknowledged  as  an  important  aspect 
in the design of security systems (Saltzer & 
Schroeder, 1975), usability received little at-
tention in the literature until the importance of 
applying human-computer interaction (HCI) 
techniques to the field of computer security was 
emphasised by studies that demonstrated that 
poorly designed security user interfaces resulted 
in degraded protection (Hitchings, 1995; Zurko 
& Simon, 1996). Although awareness of the 
importance of usability in security design has 
improved (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005), and the 
literature now contains numerous publications 
related  to  computer  security  usability,  very 
little research has investigated or addressed 
the usability issues associated with application-
oriented access controls.
Research  has  explored  usability  within 
the wider field of access control and policy 
specification. A number of publications have 
identified  general  problems  with  existing 
user-oriented  schemes  (Motiee,  Hawkey,  & 
Beznosov, 2010). The problem of usability and 
policy complexity within access controls has 
been acknowledged a number of times, and 
methods for improving the usability of policy 
specification have been explored (Brodie, Karat, 
& Karat, 2006; Cao & Iverson, 2006; Johnson, 
Karat, Karat, & Grueneberg, 2010a; Johnson, 
Karat,  Karat,  &  Grueneberg,  2010b;  Karat, 
Karat, Brodie, & Feng, 2005; Reeder et al., 
2008; Reeder, Karat, Karat, & Brodie, 2007; 
Zurko, Simon, & Sanfilippo, 1999; Zurko & 
Simon,  1996).  The  following  are  examples 
of policy authoring techniques developed by 
usable security researchers to overcome us-
ability and policy complexity problems: the 
Adage (Zurko et al., 1999) and MAP (Zurko 
&  Simon,  1996)  projects  were  designed  to 
provide usable RBAC for distributed organisa-
tions, SPARCLE is a natural language policy 
management  tool  that  guides  users  through 
the task of specifying policy (Brodie et al., 
2006; Karat et al., 2005), Expandable Grids is 
a graphical method of managing and viewing 
policy using a hierarchical matrix (Reeder et 
al., 2008), and Intentional Access Management 
produces user-oriented DAC ACL policy rules 
based on low-level access goals of end users 
(Cao & Iverson, 2006). Recently Johnson et 
al. (2010a, 2010b) have proposed techniques 
for improving the usability of guided natural 
language  policy  specification  using  policy 
templates. Findings of studies such as these 
have added weight to the idea that abstraction 
improves the usability of access controls and 
eases policy specification.
However, little research has explored the 
usability of application-oriented access controls. 
The  isolation-based Apiary  scheme  and  the 
data-centric  FileMonster  scheme  have  been 
the subjects of limited usability studies (Potter 
& Nieh, 2010; Schmid, Hill, & Ghosh, 2002). 
A simple user study, with 24 participants, was 
conducted that evaluated the ability of users 
to use applications in the Apiary environment 
(Potter & Nieh, 2010). The use of the Apiary 
desktop was compared with Xfce, a lightweight 
Linux desktop environment. Usability evalua-
tion was simply measured by time-on-task and 
participants were “asked to rate their perceived 
ease of use of each environment”. It is not 
clear what tool they used to collect this data. 
Participants were also asked some other ques-
tions “including, would the Apiary environment 
be an environment they could imagine using 
full time and would it be an environment they 
would prefer to use full time if it would keep 
their desktop secure”. Results were reported as 
affirmative, although no inferential statistics 
were employed. The FileMonster paper reports 
a simple study that measured the number of 
times the tool required user interaction (Schmid 
et al., 2002).
A  study  by  DeWitt  and  Kuljis  (2006) 
assessed  the  usability  of  the  Polaris  secu-
rity mechanism (Stiegler, Karp, Yee, Close, & 
Miller, 2006), an application-oriented access 
control  system  for  Windows  designed  with 
usability in mind. The Polaris study involved 
10 participants utilising the security system to 
carry out a number of tasks. Like the usability 60   International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 6(1), 57-76, January-March 2012
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study described in this paper, their success at 
the tasks was evaluated and perceived usability 
was measured. After using Polaris to attempt a 
number of tasks, participants on average rated 
the system 44.2 out of 100 using the System 
Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996), and the 
study concluded that further work was necessary 
to improve the usability of Polaris.
METHODOLOGY
The data analysed in this paper was collected 
as part of a broader study investigating the 
security  and  usability  of  the  three  security 
systems.  Only  those  aspects  of  the  project 
relating to user perceptions of the usability of 
the three systems are included in this paper. 
The study employed a within-subjects design, 
where participants used all three of the systems 
studied: SELinux, AppArmor, and FBAC-LSM. 
Participants were recruited from the ICT student 
body of an Australian university, a Linux users 
group, and an information security association. 
The names of the systems to be used were not 
revealed prior to participation. Forty six people 
participated; however, seven left early and their 
results were not considered during analysis.
Each participant attempted to use each of 
the systems, in a randomly allocated order, to 
restrict the actions of two applications as defined 
by separate task scenarios. The scenarios de-
scribe two realistic threats: a web browser which 
regularly processes untrusted data, and a game 
that was downloaded from an unauthenticated 
website. The web browser used was Opera, and 
the game was KSirtet (a Tetris clone), which 
had been modified to act as a simulation of a 
Trojan horse. Participants were encouraged to 
spend a maximum of approximately one hour 
on each system, with a total maximum experi-
ment time, including feedback, of four hours.
Each participant was allocated VMWare 
virtual machine (VM) images for each of the 
security systems. Due to differences in the ex-
tent that the security extensions were available 
for different Linux distributions, distributions 
were selected based on which had the highest 
level of integration for each security system. 
The SELinux environment and toolset avail-
able was provided using the Fedora 11 Linux 
distribution, and OpenSuse 11.1 was used for 
AppArmor. FBAC-LSM was deployed using 
its development environment, OpenSuse 10.3. 
The VMs were configured to be visually alike.
Information about the study and each of the 
security systems was provided via pre-recorded 
video files to ensure consistent dissemination 
of information. Participants were also provided 
with handouts including a welcome page with 
system use information and task scenarios, a 
Filesystem Hierarchy Standard (FHS) reference 
(the complete FHS v2.3 was also available as 
a PDF file), and a Linux command reference. 
Participants were instructed not to search the 
Internet for information about any of the security 
systems used.
Participants  initially  watched  an  intro-
ductory video, then filled in a pre-experiment 
questionnaire, and watched a Linux filesystem 
video (which gave an overview of the FHS). 
Then they used each of the three systems. For 
each security mechanism a video and handout 
gave an overview of the system and a demon-
stration of how to use the system. Each expla-
nation covered the same level of detail: policy 
components, how policy is represented, states 
that policies can be in (either enforced or not), 
overview of the steps to confine an applica-
tion, and a list of helpful commands. Graphical 
interfaces were favoured over command line 
tools for demonstrations. After watching the 
video  participants  attempted  to  confine  the 
two applications. Once they had finished with 
each system, participants completed a post-task 
questionnaire. After using all three systems they 
filled in a post-experiment questionnaire, and 
then were taken to another room for a debrief-
ing session where they were asked to discuss 
what they thought of each of the three systems.
A  pilot  study  was  conducted  with  four 
participants. The pilot group completed an addi-
tional questionnaire, in which they all indicated 
that they did not notice anything potentially 
biasing in the videos, presentations or handouts. 
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problems (such as VM networking issues which 
were due to software incompatibilities), which 
were all resolved before the main study.
Qualitative  data  was  collected  from 
open-ended  questions  in  the  questionnaires, 
note-taking while participants used the security 
systems, and during debriefing sessions. The 
post-task questionnaire included three written 
response questions; these requested positive and 
negative comments about the system they had 
just used, and asked how the security system 
could be improved. Each of these questions had 
space for three responses.
The debriefing sessions included six open-
ended questions, asking participants to discuss 
what they thought of each of the three systems, 
and then whether they understood the decisions 
they were making with each system. Participants 
were asked follow up questions as necessary 
for clarification. This was followed by the op-
portunity to ask participants some more specific 
questions about issues that seemed relevant or 
contentious based on previous feedback. For 
example, participants were asked whether they 
found the AppArmor severity level helpful, and 
whether they thought FBAC-LSM presented too 
much information at a time. Further details of the 
methodology can be obtained from Schreuders, 
McGill, and Payne (2011).
In order to explore the causes of difference 
in  usability  between  application-restriction 
systems, emergent themes were identified in 
the post-task questionnaire comments. Theme 
identification is a technique used in qualitative 
research to provide an insight into the issues 
that are under study by extracting meaning 
and developing explanations of phenomena. 
The survey responses of negative and positive 
comments for each of the security systems were 
analysed using a combination of qualitative 
techniques. Open coding, also known as latent 
coding, a form of inductive data analysis, was 
used to code comments based on categorising 
the underlying meaning of the text into central 
tendencies. These themes were induced, that 
is, they emerged, from the participants com-
ments. As is recommended in the literature 
(Ryan & Bernard, 2003), the complete text of 
all the comments was read a number of times. 
Following this preparation, pawing was used 
to label common themes, by marking up and 
colour coding the responses. Cutting and sort-
ing (digitally, on a spreadsheet) was used to 
organise the responses to assist the process. 
Unmarked comments were then analysed to 
attempt to identify whether they related to one 
of the previously identified themes, or formed 
new categories. In most cases the categorisa-
tion of comments into themes was an intuitive 
abstraction of the manifest content, to a form of 
latent content. For example, the comment “The 
program was a hassle to navigate between as 
the layout of the interface was larger than the 
screen and could not be scaled down” was as-
signed the “interface criticism” label. Comments 
related to general ease of use were noted and are 
discussed, but were too broad to be categorised 
into a theme, since wherever possible comments 
were categorised into more specific categories, 
many of which were related to specific aspects 
of ease of use. The presentation of themes in 
the following sections includes descriptions of 
sub-themes: the types of comments that make 
up themes.
All of the qualitative data that was collected, 
including  notes  from  debriefing  interviews 
and those taken during the experiment, were 
considered when developing suggestions for 
improving the usability of the security systems. 
Each of the major issues that were identified, 
as well as the constructive suggestions from 
participants, were formulated as suggestions 
for improving these security systems.
RESULTS
Participant Demographics
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 67 with 
an average age of 31. The vast majority were 
male, with only five female participants. As can 
be seen in Table 1, the majority of participants 
evaluated  themselves  as  possessing  above 
average computer skill; however the range of 
perceptions of computer security expertise and 
Linux expertise was much wider.62   International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 6(1), 57-76, January-March 2012
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SELinux and Usability
SELinux implements a combination of access 
control models such as role-based access control 
(RBAC), domain and type enforcement (DTE), 
and  multilevel  security  (MLS),  to  provide 
mandatory controls for Linux. DTE forms the 
basis of application restrictions, where rules 
define how processes within particular domains 
can  access  resources  labelled  with  specific 
types. A number of user-space tools to config-
ure SELinux are available, and are available 
on Linux distributions, such as Fedora, that 
provide support for SELinux. Although some 
management tasks can be achieved using GUI 
tools (such as the SELinux Policy Generator 
tool), most require the use of command line 
tools. Although configuration by end users is 
not the primary goal for SELinux, it is widely 
deployed and effectively in direct ‘competition’ 
with the alternatives, since only one LSM can 
be installed on a Linux system at a time.
A  total  of  70  negative  comments,  50 
positive  comments,  and  51  suggestions  for 
SELinux were collected from the responses to 
the post-task questionnaire. Of the three sys-
tems SELinux received the most criticism. The 
themes that emerged from these indicate some 
of the reasons for SELinux’s usability problems.
Eight themes emerged from the negative 
comments. They are listed here in descending 
order of frequency:
•  Criticism of interface (18 comments)
Participants reported a number of problems 
with the interface for SELinux. Although some 
graphical policy tools exist (and were used as 
far as possible in the study), in order to create 
policy users are required to use command line 
tools. However, as stated by a participant “com-
mand line interface reduces the usability [for] 
some people with less knowledge”. Another 
participant stated, “You need to run a script to 
compile the policy. Everything should be done 
using the GUI”. Even when using the tools 
provided to automate the generation of rules, 
users have to manually vet the rules generated 
by audit2allow. The following comment high-
lighted this, “no GUI for fine-grained editing of 
the .te files”. Three participants commented on 
the fact that the policy generator GUI did not 
fit on the display, and it could not be resized. 
Other criticisms of the interface included the 
lack of wizards to guide the processes, and 
the fact that, while SETroubleshoot identified 
policy problems, it did not allow users to use 
the tool to make the suggested policy changes.
•  Expertise required (14 comments)
In addition to the difficulty of using the 
command line (as described above), participants 
commented on the expertise required to use 
SELinux. In order to use the graphical tools to 
generate the initial skeleton policy, users “… 
require intimate knowledge of Linux, e.g., port 
numbers, dbus …”. A participant who found this 
initial part comfortable stated “While the first 
stage is easy, the following stages require knowl-
edge and use of scripts and macros that would 
take significant time to learn”. Participants also 
reported that SELinux “Requires very in-depth 
knowledge of [the] Linux file structure”, and 
“Required technical understanding/knowledge 
about the software/security system to be usable”.
Table 1. Participant self assessment 
Expertise Mean Std	dev Min Max
Skill with computers 5.82 0.90 3 7
Knowledge of computer security 4.47 1.20 2 7
Frequency of Linux use 4.24 2.32 1 7
Knowledge of Linux 3.53 1.89 1 7International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 6(1), 57-76, January-March 2012   63
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•  Unclear or confused about behaviour (9 
comments)
Some  responses  indicated  participants 
were confused by SELinux or its behaviour. 
For example, one participant said “Allowed http 
access when no ports were specified in initial 
setup”; this seems to be due to a participant not 
remembering that policies are created in permis-
sive mode. Although explained in the SELinux 
explanation video, the software did not inform 
users that new policies that are created are not 
automatically in effect.
•  Time  and  number  of  steps  involved  (6 
comments)
As  one  response  stated  “It’s  very  time 
consuming, the amount of work that has to be 
done is enormous”. Also the number of separate 
commands and steps were listed as negative 
comments.
•  Complexity of the system (6 comments)
Related to the expertise required, some re-
sponses highlighted the complexity of SELinux 
and the terminology used.
•  Unsure of success (5 comments)
Some  participants  were  not  sure  if  the 
policy they created would provide security, or 
whether they had successfully completed the 
tasks. Comments included: “It wasn’t clear if 
the security policy was going to work”, “Didn’t 
feel like I secured anything”, “No confidence 
that setup is successful in providing security”.
•  Output/policy  hard  to  understand  (4 
comments)
The format of the SELinux policy, logs 
(AVCs), and tools designed to make these easier 
for users (SETroubleshoot and audit2why) were 
criticised  as  being  hard  to  understand.  The 
output from these tools is at times extremely 
abstruse.  Comments  included:  “Even  with 
[audit2why] it couldn’t succinctly express what 
the problem was”, “The information provided 
when there was a security error was hard to 
understand.”
•  Bugs (3 comments)
A bug was identified where specifying the 
ports in the policy generator tool would result in 
a “Too many values to unpack” error message. 
Also SELinux silently ignored some denied 
actions that needed to be audited in order to 
create rules that were necessary for Opera to 
run. Neither of these faults prevented policies 
from being created; however they did introduce 
complications.
•  Other comments deemed too general to 
contribute to a specific theme
In addition to these themes, four partici-
pants commented generally that SELinux was 
difficult to use.
Six  themes  emerged  from  the  positive 
comments for SELinux:
•  Good interface (13 comments)
Two participants stated that they favoured 
the command line interface. Others referred to 
the graphical interface that is used in the first 
half of the task, stating that it is well labelled 
and easy to read. One participant stated that 
“It’s integrated nicely in the operating system”. 
Another stated that there were “not too many 
options.”
•  Good auditing and alerts (6 comments)
The  auditing  messages  and  alerts  were 
commended.  SELinux  was  the  only  system 
(by default) to include runtime notifications of 
security events as they happened. Some partici-
pants found the SETroubleshoot tool helpful. As 
stated by participants, it “gives great informative 64   International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 6(1), 57-76, January-March 2012
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messages when it blocks something”, and “had 
tools to help you locate issues and attempt to 
fix them”. One participant found audit2why and 
audit2allow “good for summarising otherwise 
unintelligible log file output.”
•  Ease of editing and updating (3 comments)
Some participants thought that it was easy 
to update and edit policy.
•  Comprehensive protection (3 comments)
Some participants commended SELinux 
for being fully featured.
•  Other  noteworthy  comments,  including 
those deemed too general to contribute to 
a specific theme
Ten  comments  were  that  SELinux  was 
generally easy or straightforward: for example, 
“Easy to use.” However, most of the evidence, 
both  qualitative  and  quantitative  does  not 
support  the  idea  that  configuring  SELinux 
is straightforward. Some of these comments 
explicitly refer to the initial stage, where the 
GUI tools were available. One separate com-
ment stated “it did not get overly technical”, 
another that it didn’t “require deep knowledge.” 
Two comments implied that SELinux would be 
good for someone with further expertise. Other 
single comments included that it seemed secure, 
and was quick.
AppArmor and Usability
AppArmor has been proposed as an easier to use 
alternative to SELinux (Suse, 2011). AppArmor 
profiles define lists of resources each program 
is allowed to access. AppArmor abstractions 
group related low-level privileges. User-space 
tools  to  configure AppArmor  are  available, 
including graphical tools that are available on 
Linux distributions such as openSUSE. These 
graphical tools can be used to create and man-
age policy, including a ‘learning mode’ used to 
create application profiles based on the actions 
a program attempted previously. AppArmor 
policies can be long and detailed, reflecting 
the  underlying  complexity  of  the  confined 
applications and the various platform layers 
these depend on.
Participants provided a total of 69 nega-
tive comments, 65 positive comments, and 54 
suggestions for AppArmor by means of the 
post-task questionnaire. In light of this data, 
some  usability  issues  have  been  identified. 
From the negative comments for AppArmor, 
7 themes were identified. They are listed here 
in descending order of frequency:
•  Expertise required (17 comments)
The AppArmor tools display almost every 
low-level resource each application utilises, and 
this exposes the complexity of applications and 
the underlying platform to end users. Most par-
ticipants did not possess the expertise necessary 
to correctly vet the rules that were generated. 
For example, one participant said “Requires 
some knowledge of what each action is and 
does in order to ensure correct configuration.”
•  Criticism of interface (14 comments)
Some responses criticised aspects of the 
interface,  such  as  the  inability  to  “navigate 
backwards  while  allowing/denying  things”, 
and the lack of a progress bar.
•  Too many decisions to make (7 comments)
The large number of security decisions the 
user needs to make to confine an application 
led many participants to click ‘allow’ without 
considering the security implications of each 
rule. For example, comments included: “Hun-
dreds of file access decisions”, “Lots of allow/
deny clicks. By the end I was just clicking allow 
without thinking / reading.”
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Related to interface criticisms, some re-
sponses identified problems participants had 
with the help provided by the AppArmor tools. 
Comments included: “Not enough explanation 
as to the modes”, “User help is poor - not able 
to define buttons use when selecting ‘help’ in 
the GUI”.
•  Time taken (6 comments)
Related to the number of decisions made, 
some responses criticised the amount of time 
it takes to create AppArmor profiles.
•  Unclear or confused about behaviour (6 
comments)
Some  responses  indicated  participants 
were confused by AppArmor or its behaviour. 
For example, “Had to resort to command line 
as couldn’t figure out GUI - maybe better after 
used command GUI first time as realised what 
to do”, “Seems to only prevent access to indi-
vidual files instead of denying unsafe actions.”
•  Unsure of success (4 comments)
Some  participants  expressed  that  they 
were “not sure how secure it was by the end 
of the process.”
•  Other  noteworthy  comments,  including 
those too general to contribute to a spe-
cific theme
Two  participants  commented  generally 
that AppArmor was difficult to use. Two com-
ments indicated that it was difficult to create 
a restrictive policy. For example, “I thought 
it was too difficult to build a ‘deny all’ policy 
(for an untrusted app) then allow permissions 
subsequently.” One participant indicated that 
configuration was complex, which was catego-
rised as relating to the theme of complexity in 
order to facilitate comparison between systems. 
Another  participant  stated  that  AppArmor 
caused the program being confined to crash, 
since they did not give the program sufficient 
privileges.
Analysis of the positive comments for Ap-
pArmor indicated these four primary themes:
•  Good interface (24 comments)
AppArmor’s  interface  was  commended 
for being “well laid out”, and “efficient”. Two 
comments mentioned that it was “well integrated 
into OS”. Three participants indicated that they 
appreciated the guided wizard-driven approach. 
Other features mentioned include the globbing 
feature, and the ability to view rules before 
they are applied.
•  Intuitive / easy to understand (11 comments)
Some participants thought that AppArmor 
had “simple concepts, [and that] the general 
configuration and profiles are simple to grasp.” 
Some comments also indicated that the learning 
mode was a concept that was easy to understand.
•  Automation (5 comments)
Five participants appreciated the ability 
of the learning mode to automate the task of 
specifying policy.
•  Seemed secure (5 comments)
Some  comments  indicated  that AppAr-
mor “seems very secure in managing program 
access”, and that they could see that it “does 
block things.”
•  Other  noteworthy  comments,  including 
those too general to contribute to a spe-
cific theme
Ten comments were that AppArmor was 
generally “easy to use”. Two comments indi-
cated that it was easy to edit or update policies. 
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expertise required, the abstractions provided, 
its comprehensiveness, and the policy format.
Functionality-Based Application 
Confinement (FBAC) and Usability
FBAC-LSM implements new techniques for 
restricting  applications.  The  access  control 
model is known as Functionality-Based Ap-
plication  Confinement  (FBAC)  (Schreuders 
& Payne, 2008a). Policy abstractions known 
as  functionalities  are  used  to  represent  the 
authority for applications to carry out features 
they provide. Functionalities are hierarchical 
(which allows them to be defined in terms of 
other  encapsulated  functionalities),  and  are 
parameterised (which allows functionalities to 
be reused to enforce abstract and configurable 
goals). These features allow the FBAC model 
to  restrict  applications  based  on  high-level 
security goals – restricting them to the features 
they should perform – while restricting them 
to the finely-grained privileges they require.
FBAC-LSM also employs a number of 
policy automation techniques which leverage 
correlations between application policy require-
ments (the FBAC functionalities applications 
require) and attributes of the applications and 
files on a Linux system. For example, the librar-
ies applications use, and the information used 
to sort applications into menus used by desktop 
environments (such as KDE and Gnome), are 
related to the features they provide. These tech-
niques automate and guide policy generation 
by suggesting functionalities and automating 
the specification of parameter values. Using 
these techniques, complete policies can usu-
ally be created for applications a priori; that is, 
without having to run the programs before or 
during policy specification. FBAC-LSM also 
contains a learning mode which can be used in 
the event that a specified policy does not allow 
a program to perform correctly.
The post-task questionnaire collected 46 
negative comments, 84 positive comments, and 
44 suggestions for FBAC-LSM. Eight themes 
were identified from the negative comments 
about  FBAC-LSM.  They  are  listed  here  in 
descending order of frequency:
•  Criticism of interface (11 comments)
Criticisms of the graphical interface in-
cluded having “too many options”, being “a bit 
arcane in its terminology”, and having popup 
dialogs that could not be suppressed.
•  Time  and  number  of  steps  involved  (9 
comments)
The  automation  process  was  relatively 
quite slow, which was criticised. Also there 
were “lots of steps.”
•  Expertise required (7 comments)
FBAC-LSM asked users to review all the 
steps that were automated. In order to fully un-
derstand the automation of parameter arguments 
participants “require a deep understanding of 
Linux file system”. As one participant put it, 
a “naïve user won’t be able to use software”. 
One  participant  commented:  “Requires  the 
individual to specify what the program does, 
not something everyone would know.”
•  Unclear or confused about behaviour (4 
comments)
Some responses indicated participants were 
confused by FBAC-LSM or its behaviour. For 
example, “Not entirely sure how the program 
works. I know the basics but not the specifics.”
•  Unsure of success (4 comments)
Four responses indicated participants were 
unsure how successfully they had configured 
FBAC-LSM. For example, a participant com-
mented “I’m not certain how secure the profile 
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•  Bugs (4 comments)
Although functional, due to its prototype 
status at the time of the study FBAC-LSM 
was unstable. Many participants experienced 
FBAC-LSM crash. Participants were simply 
informed that the crash was not their fault, 
that they would not lose the policies they had 
created, and that they should restart the VM.
•  Silent  denials  /  auditing  and  alerts  (2 
comments)
FBAC-LSM silently denies any action that 
is not authorised (notification is via dmesg). A 
graphical notification interface is in develop-
ment.
•  Name (2 comments)
FBAC-LSM’s name was criticised.
•  Help provided (2 comments)
Two participants indicated that they would 
prefer further “context-sensitive help.”
Analysis  of  the  positive  comments  for 
FBAC-LSM identified these seven themes:
•  Good interface (25 comments)
Positive  comments  regarding  FBAC-
LSM’s interface relate to: the use of wizards, 
the use of categories for organising function-
alities, and that the interface is “intuitive and 
explanatory.”  Four  positive  comments  were 
made regarding the help and guidance provided 
within the interface.
•  Automation (19 comments)
A number of participants found the auto-
mation of a priori policy specification useful. 
As one participant described it, FBAC-LSM 
“supplies default configurations and populates 
suggestions on what could be good settings 
based on previous options chosen.” Another 
participant noted, “the software was very intui-
tive, it auto-recognised the type of program it 
was”. Three participants also found the learning 
mode useful, and noted that it included “learning 
ability if profile didn’t satisfy requirements.”
•  Useful policy abstractions (6 comments)
Some participants made positive comments 
regarding the use of functionalities to assign 
authority. Comments included “Liked the pre-
configured profile templates, i.e., Internet, IRC, 
etc.”, and “Nice organisation of the programs 
to be confined in categories depending on their 
functionalities”.
•  Seems secure (4 comments)
For example, one participant stated that 
FBAC-LSM “seemed to be effective in pro-
viding adequate access for users while being 
secure”.
•  Intuitive / easy to understand (3 comments)
As one participant stated, FBAC-LSM has 
a “very easy to understand model for permis-
sions and privileges”.
•  Comprehensive protection (3 comments)
Some responses commented that the level 
of  protection  provided  “appears  to  be  very 
comprehensive”.
•  Ease of editing and updating (3 comments)
Some responses commended the ease of 
changing  existing  policy.  For  example  one 
participant stated that it was “easy to update 
policies.”
•  Other  noteworthy  comments,  including 
those too general to contribute to a spe-
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Fifteen  comments  commended  FBAC-
LSM for being generally easy. The “ability to 
test the application without running it, eg test 
if can write to a file” was commended by two 
participants. Also FBAC-LSM was described 
as “quick”.
DISCUSSION
Usability  has  long  been  acknowledged  as 
an important aspect in the design of security 
systems (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975; Zurko & 
Simon, 1996). However, very little research has 
investigated usability issues associated with 
application-oriented access controls (Alexander 
& Jasna, 2006), or identified the security issues 
that arise in this field. The qualitative analysis of 
the comments provided by participants identi-
fied a number of emergent themes. These themes 
give an indication of the existing problems 
and strengths of the systems studied, serve as 
a means of comparison between systems, and 
identify a number of issues that can affect the 
usability of application-restriction mechanisms 
and inform both the design of new systems and 
the development of existing ones.
Negative Factors 
Affecting Usability
Qualitative analysis identified 11 themes in the 
negative comments across the three systems, 
which correspond to factors that can be the cause 
of decreased usability in application-oriented 
access controls. Table 2 lists these factors and 
shows how many comments about each system 
corresponded with each factor. The two most 
prominent issues were interface design, and 
expertise required. The amount of time taken, 
and the confusion and uncertainty of users were 
also common themes, which are related to the 
two main issues and should be considered when 
assessing the interface and expertise required 
for application-oriented access controls.
Previous HCI security (HCISec) research 
has demonstrated that interface problems can 
impact the protections provided by security 
systems (Alma & Tygar, 1999). The research 
described in this paper research supports those 
findings, and demonstrates that interface design 
impacts the usability of application-restriction 
schemes.
The user interface for SELinux was par-
ticularly criticised, in part due to the lack of 
graphical tools. AppArmor has a more complete 
set of graphical tools compared to SELinux, but 
still requires a high-level of expertise to utilise 
Table 2. Themes in negative comments 
Theme SELinux AppArmor FBAC-LSM Total
Poor interface design 18 14 11 43
Level of expertise required 14 17 7 38
Time taken and steps required 6 6 9 21
Unclear behaviour 9 6 4 19
Clarity of success 5 4 4 13
Help and guidance provided 0 6 2 8
Complexity 6 1 0 7
Bugs 3 0 4 7
Number of decisions required 0 7 0 7
Output format 4 0 0 4
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correctly.  However,  the  graphical  interface 
provided for AppArmor is relatively simple, 
and  since  interface  design  appears  to  be  a 
significant aspect of the perceived usability, 
this helps explain the fact that AppArmor was 
preferred by some participants. The FBAC-
LSM interface was criticised for the amount of 
information presented to users. A few negative 
comments also focused on the large number of 
steps in the FBAC-LSM wizard, and the help 
provided. However, the FBAC-LSM interface 
received the least amount of criticism.
The nature of the problem of defining rules 
that allow programs to run and perform their 
legitimate tasks while also restricting programs 
from acting maliciously results in complex poli-
cies. The task of creating and configuring these 
complex policies can require advanced exper-
tise. This is particularly the case with SELinux, 
which requires high levels of expertise in un-
derstanding the complex constructs that policy 
is composed of, in addition to the expertise 
necessary to use the command line tools. Due to 
its graphical interface AppArmor requires less 
expertise to operate, but still requires advanced 
expertise to be used meaningfully, since users 
need to decide which resources the program 
should be allowed to access.
A number of participants who rated them-
selves as experts in Linux and/or IT security 
(such as a Linux system administrator and a 
security professional) were not successful at 
utilising either AppArmor or SELinux to confine 
malicious code (Schreuders et al., 2011). For 
example, some “expert” participants believed 
that they had correctly confined the applica-
tions but had actually left the Trojan simulation 
free to perform numerous malicious actions, 
including compromising the security of their 
personal data and obtaining system or user-level 
compromise. This illustrates that users do not 
typically have the expertise to vet the low-
level actions of applications. This observation 
has substantial ramifications for the usability 
of the approaches taken by many application-
oriented access control mechanisms including 
AppArmor and SELinux, and their ability to 
use learning modes to confine malware. This 
also further emphasises the importance of the 
expertise required, and its effect on usability 
and security.
FBAC-LSM  incorporates  techniques  to 
abstract  policy  into  high-level  goals  and  to 
automate tasks. The result of these features is 
that users are not required to vet every low-level 
action that applications perform, thus reduc-
ing the expertise required while still allowing 
users to enforce their specific security goals. 
The results reported in this paper support the 
theory that reducing the expertise requirement 
can improve usability, as expertise required is a 
stronger theme with the data collected regarding 
SELinux and AppArmor than with FBAC-LSM.
The other negative themes identified were 
more specific to particular systems. Related to 
the expertise required, SELinux is a particularly 
complex system, and the output from the tools 
exposes the complexity of the policy language 
and constructs to users. Although the interface 
is simple, AppArmor exposes users to the low 
level complexity of the resource requirements 
of applications, requiring users to vet nearly 
every action performed; this results in a very 
large number of security decisions for the user 
to make and a high level of expertise is required 
to vet the rules generated. Also, related to the 
interface, the in-program help provided by Ap-
pArmor was criticised. Many of the negative 
comments for FBAC-LSM are related to its 
prototype status at the time of the study: it was 
slow, contained a number of bugs, and lacked 
an interactive graphical notification tool.
In addition to the main common themes 
described at the start of this section, the fol-
lowing  themes  affected  the  usability  of  the 
systems studied and should be considered in 
future research and design: complexity of the 
system, format of output, auditing and alerts, 
and bugs.
Positive Factors Affecting Usability
Analysis of the positive comments collected 
identified nine themes. These correspond to 
factors that can have a positive impact on the 
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Table 3 lists these factors and indicates how 
many comments about each system correspond-
ed with each factor. Again, a large number of 
comments related to the general quality of the 
interface. Automation of policy specification, 
the intuitiveness of the scheme, alerts, and the 
abstractions used also appear to be significant 
factors that can positively affect the usability 
of application-oriented access controls.
Some of the positive interface attributes 
that were commonly mentioned include: wiz-
ards and step-by-step guidance, simplicity of 
the interface, integration with the rest of the 
operating system, logical grouping of concepts 
and widgets, multiple approaches available for 
performing tasks, and policy review features. 
SELinux,  AppArmor,  and  FBAC-LSM  all 
employ  some  form  of  wizard  interface  for 
creating application policies. SELinux provides 
a wizard for the initial stage. Some participants 
liked this tool, but many were not satisfied by 
the requirement to also use command line tools. 
AppArmor  provides  a  wizard  for  creating 
policies using the learning mode. FBAC-LSM 
provides a wizard for a priori policy specifica-
tion, and also a learning mode tool to add rules 
to existing policies. Participants believed that 
FBAC-LSM provided the most guidance in the 
form of on-screen help. AppArmor had the 
simplest interface, in terms of the amount of 
details displayed at a time (although, as dis-
cussed, this was displayed for too many deci-
sions). SELinux and AppArmor were naturally 
better integrated into the operating system, since 
these are included in the Linux distributions 
used, and were incorporated into the administra-
tion tools for the distribution, although this is 
not an intrinsic advantage of either system. For 
example, SUSE Yast includes an AppArmor 
panel with launchers for the AppArmor con-
figuration tools. The fact that AppArmor and 
FBAC-LSM include the ability to review the 
policies that are created were also described as 
positives. FBAC-LSM included extensive re-
view  and  query  capabilities  that  allow  the 
permissions to be tested without running the 
application.
Automation was a common theme in praise 
for  FBAC-LSM.  FBAC-LSM’s  automation 
techniques  leverage  the  policy  abstractions 
used by the scheme to create policies a priori 
(Schreuders, Payne, & McGill, 2011). The ef-
fect of this is that a lower level of expertise is 
required, and fewer decisions need to be made 
by end users, compared to the learning mode 
method of automation provided by AppArmor 
and SELinux. The learning mode scheme of Ap-
pArmor was commended by some participants. 
The intuitiveness theme, mainly attributed to 
AppArmor, can in part be explained by the 
simplicity of the notion of learning rules based 
on what an application does. FBAC-LSM also 
included a learning mode, for the situation that 
policies created a priori required extra rules. 
Comments such as “Had learning ability if pro-
file didn’t satisfy requirements” indicated that 
Table 3. Themes in positive comments 
Theme SELinux AppArmor FBAC-LSM Total
Good interface 13 24 25 62
Automation 0 5 19 24
Intuitive 0 11 3 14
Seemed secure 0 5 4 9
Editing and updating 3 2 3 8
Comprehensive 3 1 3 7
Abstractions 0 1 6 7
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those participants understood that the FBAC-
LSM learning mode can be used if policies that 
are created do not provide all the privileges 
required by the application to function.
A fundamental aspect of the FBAC model 
is the policy abstraction (functionalities) that 
assigns privileges based on the features that 
applications  provide. As  described,  FBAC-
LSM’s automation techniques leverage these 
abstractions. A  number  of  participants  also 
explicitly identified these abstractions as posi-
tive aspects of FBAC-LSM (shown in Table 
3 as the abstractions theme), other comments 
described the FBAC-LSM permission model as 
intuitive. Some mention the primitive abstrac-
tions used by AppArmor: for example, “KDE”. 
In  contrast,  the  complexity  of  the  SELinux 
model  was  criticised.  These  results  support 
the theory that the type of policy abstraction 
implemented has a significant impact on the 
usability of application-oriented access control 
schemes, and that functionalities can provide 
usability benefits.
Other  factors,  such  as  how  secure  the 
system seems and how easy it is to update 
and change existing policies, can also have an 
effect on perceived usability. The alerts and 
notifications employed also can have an effect. 
SELinux systems, by default, typically come 
with user-space notification and auditing tools, 
which were praised by some participants. Ap-
pArmor notification tools exist, but are typically 
disabled by default. FBAC-LSM did not include 
notification tools, due to its prototype status.
USABILITY IMPROVEMENT 
SUGGESTIONS
Based on all the qualitative information col-
lected, this section proposes changes to SE-
Linux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM to address 
or mitigate a number of the issues identified. 
Due to fundamental design properties of these 
systems, some of these suggestions may be 
challenging to implement. However, they are 
included for completeness and to aid in the 
design of new solutions to application-oriented 
access controls.
Suggestions for 
Improving SELinux
Currently no graphical tool has been developed 
to step users through the entire task of confining 
applications using the standard SELinux primi-
tives.  The  system-config-selinux  tool  could 
be used to browse an overview of the policies 
installed and to edit the SELinux configuration, 
and polgengui, the SELinux Policy Genera-
tion tool, could be used to create a barebones 
template policy module. However, no graphical 
interface was available to complete policy de-
velopment or to compile and apply the created 
policy. Some participants reported that they were 
uncomfortable with the amount of command-
line interaction required, and some participants 
simply refused to attempt the console portion 
of the task. Therefore it is proposed that tools 
are developed for SELinux that:
•  Cover the whole process of creating, edit-
ing, compiling and enabling policies; and
•  Step users through the complete process 
using a wizard style interface.
The tools used to create rules based on ac-
cess denials do not currently step users through 
the process of vetting the generated rules. During 
the usability study it was observed that most 
participants did not review the rules that they 
added to policy modules. Therefore, since SE-
Linux relies on the successful vetting of these 
rules it is suggested that the graphical interface:
•  Facilitate the vetting of learned rules.
It is also suggested that a graphical tool 
should:
•  Provide information about the practical 
impact of rules. For example, a list of all 
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the ability to query whether an application 
is authorised to access particular resources.
Based on participant feedback it is also 
recommended that:
•  Graphical tools provide further documenta-
tion and hints; and
•  The ability should be included to take ac-
tion from the setroubleshoot tool to make 
the policy changes it suggests.
Rules are represented in a format that was 
reported by a number of participants as hard to 
understand. Thus, it is suggested that:
•  The policy language is simplified to make 
rules easier to understand.
This  is  particularly  important  while  no 
gui tools are available to assist in the vetting 
of  rules.  Other  alternative  approaches  such 
as  intermediary  policy  languages  (such  as 
the common intermediary language (cil) and 
simplified policy description language (spdl) 
(Nakamura, Sameshima, & Tabata, 2009) and 
easier to understand alternative views of policy 
may help alleviate policy abstruseness. It is also 
recommended that:
•  The feedback from all selinux tools be im-
proved. This should include the scripts used 
to compile policy modules. Improving the 
output from audit2why and setroubleshoot 
is particularly important since the format 
of the avc denial logs cannot easily be read 
by humans. Perhaps include a simplified 
interface for less technical users.
A number of flaws were noted that should 
be corrected:
•  The polgengui tool did not inform users 
that the created policies start in permis-
sive mode.
•  The polgengui tool contained a bug that 
occasionally reports that there were “too 
many values to unpack” when port numbers 
are specified.
•  The size of the polgengui tool’s window 
did not fit on low resolution displays and 
could not be resized.
•  Default  policies  should  provide  actual 
confinement: the default policy for ksirtet 
did not.
•  AVC denial logs were sent to one of two 
separate log files (dmesg and audit.log). 
This has been acknowledged as a bug.
•  The failure to log relevant denials, as was 
the case with Opera, should be investigated.
Suggestions for 
Improving AppArmor
Most users do not appear to have the expertise 
required to perform vetting using the current 
AppArmor interface. Since the level of security 
AppArmor provides depends on the success-
ful vetting of rules, the following changes are 
proposed.
Participants were divided over the useful-
ness of the severity levels that are displayed as 
a guide for users during vetting. A few pointed 
out that, for most resources, the severity level 
was ‘unknown’. Many found the severity levels 
to be ambiguous. Therefore these improvements 
are proposed:
•  Clarify severity levels using colour cod-
ing; and
•  Clarify the scale used by displaying what 
the maximum and minimum levels are.
It  is  suggested  that  apparmor  should 
also provide more useful information about 
resources and executables, such as including 
descriptions of:
•  The purpose of each resource;
•  The  risks  of  granting  access  to  certain 
resources; and
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This could be implemented by extending 
the current resource database that is used to 
calculate severity levels, or by assigning this 
information directly to  files using extended 
attributes.
Based on participant feedback it is also 
suggested that AppArmor should:
•  Provide more help describing the on-screen 
elements. For example, clarify the meaning 
of access types such as “mrw”;
•  Provide an optional simplified interface 
for less experienced users;
•  Allow users to navigate back to change their 
mind about previous rules they have set;
•  Give an indication of progress through the 
process of vetting rules;
•  Optionally,  provide  rules  in  list  format 
for vetting;
•  Allow users to skip denials and deal with 
them later rather than only having the op-
tion to allow or deny;
•  Allow users to edit profiles as text from 
the apparmor control panel;
•  Allow users to use the graphical update tool 
to only update specific policies, rather than 
updating all the policies that have denied 
access to resources; and
•  Improve the interface integration between 
the various graphical tools, such as the 
new  application  profile  wizard  and  the 
update wizard.
Also, where possible, parts of the process 
could be automated. For example:
•  Automatically  suggest  globing  where 
appropriate.
Some participants inadvertently left pro-
files in complaining mode. Therefore:
•  The enforcing state should be made more 
obvious to users.
Participants found it hard to create poli-
cies incrementally due to the potentially very 
large number of resources used. Therefore it is 
recommended to:
•  Have  predefined  templates  that  can  be 
used as a starting point to develop profiles.
Suggestions for Improving 
FBAC-LSM
Although FBAC-LSM demonstrated significant 
usability advantages, there is room for future im-
provement. A number of participants provided 
criticism of the graphical policy manager tool 
that should be addressed in future development.
The FBAC-LSM policy manager required 
users to review each step that was automated. 
Some participants would have preferred:
•  Options to automatically accept the auto-
mated suggestions; or
•  The ability to review the entire automated 
configuration at once rather than on a step 
by step basis.
Some participants would have preferred a 
simplified interface, while others appreciated 
the detail provided. Therefore, it is suggested 
that:
•  The policy manager should provide ad-
vanced and simplified modes to cater to 
the differing expertise of users.
Also, where possible:
•  The  terminology  used  by  the  graphical 
tools should be simplified;
•  Slightly larger fonts should be used where 
appropriate; and
•  Less information should be displayed at 
a time.
When FBAC-LSM prevents an applica-
tion from performing actions, access is silently 
denied. There are situations where users should 
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•  A notification tool should be developed that 
can inform users when actions are denied, 
and enable users to take appropriate actions. 
It is suggested that not every denied action 
needs to be reported to the user, but when 
a denied action is likely to be malicious 
or the access is required for the program 
to function the tool should alert the user.
The automation features are slow to cal-
culate suggestions. Therefore:
•  Functionality suggestions and parameter 
value automation should be optimised in 
order to perform automation faster.
Other relevant suggestions provided by 
participants include:
•  The GUI should provide more informa-
tion  about  the  security  implications  of 
functionalities;
•  The mechanism for reloading and saving 
policies should be improved;
•  The GUI should allow applications to be 
sorted alphabetically.
CONCLUSION
Major differences in usability have been iden-
tified between three different approaches to 
application-restrictions: SELinux, AppArmor 
and  FBAC-LSM  (Schreuders  et  al.,  2011). 
This paper presents the results of a qualitative 
analysis of user comments to explore the rea-
sons for the usability differences between the 
three security systems. These results provide an 
insight into the causes of usability issues associ-
ated with application-oriented access controls.
A number of themes were identified in sur-
vey feedback from participants. These themes 
indicate factors that can affect the usability of 
application-restriction mechanisms. The fac-
tors were used to compare the three systems 
and explain how their different approaches to 
application confinement lead to differences in 
usability.  Qualitative  analysis  supported  the 
theory that techniques employed by FBAC-
LSM, such as policy abstraction and automation, 
have a positive effect on usability. These results 
demonstrate  that  the  FBAC  model’s  policy 
abstractions,  and  the  automation  techniques 
developed for FBAC-LSM, result in usability 
benefits.
A number of other factors that affect the 
usability of application-confinement schemes 
were also identified. It is proposed that the fac-
tors that were identified can be used to inform 
the design of new systems and development 
of existing ones.
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